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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on the fiscal 
performance of EU member states. I will show that the process towards EMU and the 
accompanying Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) have increased fiscal performance in the EU 
member states. Small EU states have generally performed better than big states, because they were 
more constrained by the institutions of the SGP: During the period of accession, the threat of being 
excluded from the final stage of EMU was more severe than for the large states in the core of the 
EU (Germany and France). Second, as members of the EMU, smaller states will encounter higher 
difficulties in finding allies to avoid punishment through sanctions in the Council. 
Kurzfassung
Die Arbeit untersucht den Einfluss der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (WWU) auf die 
Fiskalpolitik der EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Es wird gezeigt, dass der Prozess der Errichtung der WWU 
und der diesen Prozess begleitende Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt (SGP) die Performanz der 
mitgliedstaatlichen Fiskalpolitiken verbessert hat. Kleine EU-Mitgliedstaaten schneiden im 
Allgemeinen besser ab als die großen Mitgliedstaaten, weil sie durch die Institutionen des SGP 
stärker beschränkt werden: Während der Periode der Errichtung der WWU war die Gefahr, von der 
Teilnahme der letzten Stufe ausgeschlossen zu werden, für kleinere Staaten größer als für die 
großen Staaten des Kerneuropas (Deutschland, Frankreich). Zweitens, selbst als Mitglieder der 
WWU werden es kleine Staaten schwerer haben, im Rat Verbündete zu finden, um Sanktionen 
wegen Nicht-Einhaltung der Defizitkriterien zu vermeiden. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper examines the impact of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on the fiscal 
performance of EU member states. Fiscal performance is hereby defined as the degree to which a 
country achieves certain normative goals in fiscal policy: Lower deficits, higher surplusses, lower 
debt levels, or a change rate towards lower debt levels improve fiscal performance; higher deficits, 
higher debt levels, or change rates towards higher debt levels are signs of deterioration in fiscal 
performance. In this paper, I will show that the process towards EMU and the accompanying 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) have increased fiscal performance in the EU member states. Small 
EU states have generally performed better than big states, because they were more constrained by the 
institutions of the SGP: During the period of accession, the threat of being excluded from the final 
stage of EMU was more severe than for the large states in the core of the EU (Germany and France). 
Second, as members of the EMU smaller states will encounter higher difficulties in finding allies to 
avoid punishment through sanctions in the Council. 
The effectiveness of EMU in raising the sustainability of fiscal policies in member states is highly 
debated. Many critics consider the EMU and the SGP, which is supposed to guarantee a better fiscal 
performance of the member states, to be unsustainable in itself (McKay 1999; Ferguson / Kotlikoff 
2000). Bernaldo de Quiros (1999) speaks of a “political time bomb” that will explode when strategic 
debt accumulation of member states (Beetsma / Bovenberg 2002) forces the European central bank 
to loosen its strict monetary regime. This would then impose negative externalities in the form of 
higher interest rates and lower private investment on the other member states. Although some argue 
(Buti / Giudice 2002; Rotte 1998) that the race for membership during the 1990s has indeed had a 
substantial effect on the member states’ fiscal performance, this effect is not expected to last as the 
question of membership has been settled and the remaining sanctioning mechanisms rely on the 
mutual condemnation of the states (Freitag / Sciarini 2001). But when all the states face the same 
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This paper challenges the far-reaching skepticism regarding the problem-solving capacity of the 
EMU. The next section shows with the help of a pooled time series analysis, that there has been a 
positive effect on fiscal performance, even if one controls for many other variables that have been 
found to have an influence on public deficits. In addition, I look at the changes in debt levels. The 
third section of this paper compares differences in means between EU and non-EU countries as well 
as between EMU and non-EMU countries for the time period between 1980 and 2002. This analyis 
confirms the findings of the previous section. In the fourth section, data on differences in means 
between small and big EU countries is presented. This sections also deals with possible explanations 
for these findings. The final section concludes and comments on the latest developments in the 
struggle around the SGP.  
2. Tracing Maastricht  
2.1. Data and Hypotheses 
This chapter shows in a cross-sectional time series analysis the impact of the process of monetary 
and economic integration. The analysis looks at 22 OECD countries(2) in the period between 1980 
and 2000. The hypothesis to be tested is that membership or prospective membership in the EMU 
had a significant and positive impact on fiscal performance, i.e. led to lower deficits or higher 
surplusses. I also control for other variables that have been deemed important for the analysis of 
public debts. 
The dependent variable is the current budget balance (current receipts minus current disbursements) 
in % of GDP, taken from the OECD Economic Outlook Database. Disbursements include interest 
payments, so my dependent variable is not the primary balance. Discussion in the literature is split 
about which dependent variable to use: Some argue in favor of using the primary balance, because it 
is deemed to be a better indicator of political activity (Freitag / Sciarini 2001: 166). However, an 
incumbent government has no choice but to accept the inherited debt of its predecessor. Interest 
payments on inherited debt can destroy the outside appearance of fiscal prudence, although the 
government may be running high primary surplusses. Still, accession to the EMU was not made 
dependent on primary balances, but on total balances. Governments that had inherited a high public 
debt were in a worse starting position, because interest payments tilted the budgets downwards. The 
decisive variable however remained the overall budget deficit. Therefore, I chose it as dependent 
variable. 
Another important strand of the literature argues in favor of using year-to-year changes in the public 
debt to GDP ratio as dependent variable (De Haan / Sturm 1994: 162; Roubini / Sachs 1989b: 904-
905). Looking at changes in the debt level means adopting a strong long-term point of view. It is 
imaginable, that a government runs high surplusses without reducing the level of public debt, 
because public money is re-invested. At least theoretically, under special circumstances, like the 
process towards EMU, high deficits can also go along with reductions in debt levels. Therefore, I 
will also use changes in gross debt levels as dependent variables to test the robustness of the 
findings. 
The choice of independent variables reflects the different explanatory approaches of comparative 
political economy: 
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First, there are of course economic control variables like GDP growth, inflation (CPI), and 
unemployment rates, taken from the OECD Economic Outlook Database as well as from OECD 
Historical Statistics. In the context of public debts, there are good theoretical reasons for economic 
factors to have a significant impact on budget deficits. High economic growth, c.p., creates more tax 
revenue and thus reduces the deficit. On the other hand, high unemployment leads to higher 
spending (in the case of public unemployment insurance, in some countries also for active labour 
market policies) and to lower revenue (less contributions from employees and employers) at the 
same time. Thus, economic growth is hypothesized to have a positive impact on budget balances, 
while high unemployment is expected to have a negative impact. The overall impact of economic 
factors is expected to be very significant. Budgets contain a number of entitlement programs with 
fixed benefits, contributions and eligibility criteria (fixed at least in the short term), so that changes 
in the economic environment directly lead to changes in revenue and spending. But the story does 
not end here. Political, institutional and partisan factors can be expected to increase the overall 
explanatory power of the argument considerably. What is more, when economic factors are given the 
same status as independent variables as political variables, there is a certain risk to underestimate the 
impact of the political factors, because economical factors are assumed to be completely exogenous, 
while in reality, they also depend to a certain extent on political and institutional factors (Franzese 
2002: 167).  
Second, the influence of the governing parties will be assessed both directly and in conjunction with 
other factors (unemployment rates). Early studies (Hibbs 1977) found that leftist parties in 
government tend to reduce unemployment even if this leads to higher inflation, while rightist party 
governments pay more attention to low inflation rates with less regard to unemployment rates. It has 
been conventional wisdom that left governments tend to spend more than right governments 
(Cameron 1985). But from this, it does not necessarily follow that left governments run higher 
deficits. Instead, a number of studies (Cameron 1985; Cusack 1999; Wagschal 1996; Franzese 2002) 
found that leftist governments run lower deficits. Right parties in government often lower taxes 
without reducing spending, which creates higher deficits, whereas left governments seem to finance 
their expansionary spending programs by creating higher revenues (Wagschal 1996: 183). Carlsen 
(1997) adds one caveat: Leftist governments, at least for the period of the 80s, tend to run higher 
deficits when high unemployment prevails. They seem to be more sensitive towards deteriorating 
economic conditions, mainly because high unemployment strongly affects their main constituencies 
(employees). In this analysis, my independent variables are the share of seats in the cabinet taken by 
left, right, and christian democratic parties. I also add a variable that measures the combined impact 
of the power of socialdemocratic parties in government and unemployment rates(3). 
Third, and most importantly, I control for institutional variables. I will focus on government 
institutions and their impact on fiscal performance, because these variables have been most 
prominent in comparative political economy. It can be argued that these institutions have a more 
direct impact on performance than macro-level political institutions like corporatism or the 
constitutional veto-structure of a given country, although the latter are not without explanatory 
power (see Wagschal 1996, who finds a positive impact of corporatism on fiscal performance). 
Looking at government institutions, the weakness of an incumbent government has been found to 
lead to higher deficits / lower surplusses (Roubini / Sachs 1989 a,b; Borrelli / Royed 1995; Edin / 
Ohlsson 1991; Grilli / Masciandaro / Tabellini 1991; Hallerberg / von Hagen 1999). Others 
(Sakamoto 2001; Wagschal 1996) have challenged this hypothesis. The theoretical reasoning behind 
it points to three factors: the number of coalition parties, the type of government (majority of 
minority government) and the average tenure of governments. 
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First, the higher the number of coalition parties, the weaker the government and the worse the fiscal 
performance. Each governing party has its own constituencies that have to be served (Sakamoto 
2001: 533). In a climate of austerity, when the distribution of losses happens more often than the 
distribution of gains, each party is a veto player in the decision-making arena of the government. 
Above all in mininum winning coalitions, each player has the institutional power to block or water 
down spending cuts by threatening to leave the coalition to protect his constituencies in order to 
increase his chances of re-election. A similar logic applies to the variable “number of ministers in a 
cabinet”. The more spending ministers there are, the higher the deficits (Kontopoulos / Perotti 1999, 
who find that the number of spending ministers is more important than the number of parties in a 
coalition). This is somewhat surprising, because the linkage between a single minister (as member of 
a party) and a certain constituency is not as strong and direct as between a party and its electoral 
base. But each minister heads a department of the government, which by itself can be a powerful 
bureaucracy with strong interests in power expansion. Pressurized by his departmental 
administration and led by his own interests in gaining more power vis-á-vis his ministerial 
colleagues, each minister has an incentive to increase the size of his budget and get involved in log-
rolling to help others expanding their budget. Only the prime minister and the finance minister do 
not have this incentive (for further elaboration on this point see below).  
The second factor is the type of government. Roubini and Sachs construct an index to measure to 
degree of political coherence of the government (Roubini / Sachs 1989 a,b). This index unfortunately 
mixes the distinctive dimensions of number of parties in the coalition and type of government. This 
has been rightly critized (Sakamoto 2001: 532; Edin / Ohlsson 1991; Borelli / Royed 1995),(4) 
because it unnecessarily gives away opportunities to increase information and explanatory power. 
The critique focusses on the treatment of minority governments by Roubini and Sachs, which are 
ascribed to the highest degree of weakness, because they are expected to be bound by fluctuating and 
unstable coalitions in parliament. But there is no theoretical reason to assume that minority 
governments are weaker than multi-party majority governments per se. Not only do majority 
governments face the risk of being held accountable for budget decisions to a greater extent 
(Sakamoto 2001: 532), minority governments can also sometimes take advantage of their minority 
position by building different coalitions for different policy projects. They can also threaten potential 
coalition partners to form a policy coalition with other parties. Thus, the dimensions of size and type 
of government have to be kept seperately. Therefore, I will not use the Roubini and Sachs index, but 
instead control for the individual variables. 
The third factor is government tenure or government turnover. If a government anticipates remaining 
in office only for a short period of time, then the temptation to increase deficits becomes stronger as 
the government can expect not to be held accountable for the resulting deficit problems. Thus, the 
hypothesis is: The shorter the average government tenure or the higher the government turnover, the 
higher the deficits (for others Grilli / Masciandaro / Tabellini 1991: 358). 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) try to connect the weak / deficit-prone government hypothesis to 
the structure of the party and electoral system. They argue that in proportional voting systems the 
number of parties in parliament is higher, and therefore, the necessity to build multiparty government 
coalitions instead of single-party governments is, too. In majority systems, the chances of obtaining 
single-party governments are considered to be much higher. The consequences for fiscal policy, 
besides the argument that many parties in the coalition tend to produce higher deficits, are in their 
view that single party governments tend to overcome the collective action problem of how to keep 
the spending ministers at bay by delegating a lot of power to a strong finance minister. 
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The incentives of a finance minister are expected to be different from ‘conventional’ spending 
ministers, because the finance minister gains prestige and power not by expanding his budget, but by 
controlling the other spending ministers and circumscribing their spending phantasies (see also 
Alesina / Perotti 1999). To extensively test the Hallerberg / von Hagen thesis, one would have to test 
their inferences from the party system and the electoral systems to the strength of government and 
the position of the minister of finance first before then testing the impact on fiscal performance.(5) In 
fact, the Hallerberg / von Hagen-thesis adds just another element to the causal chain: They do not 
question the weak / deficit-prone government hypothesis, instead they try to link the existence of 
weak governments to institutional features of the electoral and the party system. Because the 
expected direct effect of these factors is probably weak, I will not include them in the empirical 
analyses later on. 
To operationalize the institutional hypotheses, I use variables from different sources. The number of 
cabinet members (AKAB) was taken from Schmidt (2003). This variable substitutes the ‘number of 
spending ministers’ variable, which has been tested by Kontopoulos / Perotti 1999. This is possible 
because it can be assumed that the number of ‘non-spending’ ministers (normally only the finance 
minister) is more or less constant between countries. What is more, the distinction between spending 
and non-spending ministers introduces an element of arbitrariness: Questions about the status of the 
head of government arise: Does he really belong to the ‘non-spending’ fraction or does he have a 
strong incentive to avoid serious spending cuts, because he will be the one to be punished most 
severely in the next election? Thus, it seems reasonable to use the variable ‘number of cabinet 
members’. 
Another variable reflects the majority that a government coalition has in parliament (MAJ) on a 
yearly basis. This variable is taken from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al. 
2000) to operationalize the type of government. It is a continuous variable and therefore preferable to 
a simple dummy variable on the minority / majority status of a government. Two other variables 
from the DPI are used to operationalize government turnover: One measures the number of years 
that the chief executive has remained in office (YRSOFFC) and the other the number of years that 
the party of the chief executive has remained in charge of governing the country (PRTYIN). 
It is interesting to look at macro-level institutional variables. The independence of the national 
central bank is an important example. Governments that are confronted with a highly independent 
central bank will not run high deficits, because they cannot artificially reduce debt levels with the 
help of inflation (Franzese 2002: 146). They can neither rely on the central bank to bail them out if 
debt levels have risen too much (the EC treaty f.e. explicitly rules out bail-outs for national 
governments by the ECB). And third, they cannot force the central bank to lower interest rates if 
these have risen because of massive public borrowing and resulting crowding-out effects. Therefore, 
independent central banks improve the fiscal performance of states. 
I include a second macro-level institutional variable: the number of vetoplayers. Some studies 
(Obinger / Wagschal 2000) found that many vetoplayers have been a reason for retarded welfare 
state development in some states (Switzerland, USA), because powerful “countermajoritarian 
institutions” (Schmidt 2000: 351-354) have only reluctantly transferred spending power to the 
central government. Extending this argument, one could expect better fiscal performance for 
countries with a strong constitutional veto structure, because spending pressures are reduced. I 
expect a different outcome, because the fiscal climate has changed “from expansion to 
austerity” (Pierson 2001). In times of austerity, when the reduction of deficits becomes an important 
policy goal in order to create more fiscal leeway for other policy decisions, a strong constitutional 
veto structure can hinder consolidation initiatives from the central government. 
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For example, a strong second parliamentary chamber can increase the chances of the opposition to 
exert influence, especially when the opposition controls a majority of seats in the second chamber 
(f.e. Germany for the most part of the 1990s until today). Party competition promotes the adoption of 
a contra-consolidation policy strategy by the opposition in order to increase their chances of 
government take-over in the next elections. Another example are public social insurance funds: when 
these are not part of the general government budget but instead self-administrated and financed by 
contributions instead of general tax revenue, this creates another strong institutional barrier against 
quick consolidation. These examples show intuitively that a strong constitutional veto structure can 
be expected to increase deficits. To measure the constitutional veto structure, I use Manfred 
Schmidt’s (2000: 352-353) index of veto points (‘VETO’).(6) 
Finally, two subsidiary variables have to be added. One is the lagged current account deficit (the 
lagged dependent variable). Although this variable has to be added because of methodical reasons, 
there is also a theoretical consideration behind it, namely policy inheritance: High budget deficits are 
hard to dismantle. Consolidation policies go together with high political costs, because they are often 
linked to spending cuts or tax hikes. Especially, when deficits are high, the policy inheritance effect 
will be very strong. When countries run budget surplusses (which is rather seldom), the policy 
inheritance effects will be not as strong: Money is easier spent than saved. 
The second subsidiary variable is trade openness (measured by the sum of imports and exports as 
percent of GDP, ‘OPENNESS’). The ongoing economic internationalization since the 1980s has 
increased the pressure on governments to avoid unsustainable spending practices. Yet, it is still 
highly debated if increasing openness leads to higher compensatory spending and larger deficits 
(Sakamoto 2001: 539) or to lower deficits because of considerations of competitiveness (Wagschal 
1996: 146). 
It is interesting to assess the impact of EMU vis-á-vis the impact of the general trend towards 
economic internationalization. The question is if EMU had an independent impact or if the variations 
in the fiscal performance can be explained by the variations in the openness of a country towards 
forces of economic internationalization. 
For EMU membership, I constructed two dummy variables. One (“EU member after 1992”) gives 
each EU member from 1992 on the value of 1 (Austria, Finland and Sweden from 1995). This 
dummy is supposed to capture the effects of the Maastricht process for all EU member countries, 
regardless if they become a member of the Eurozone later on or not. The other dummy variable 
(“later member of Eurozone”) adopts the value of 1 for countries of the later Eurozone after 1992, 
countries (Denmark, Sweden, UK) that have opted out, continue to receive 0. Greece became an 
EMU member in 2001 only, but gets 1 after 1999 to control for consolidation efforts prior to 
accession to the EMU. 
2.2. Findings  
Table 1  
Table 1(7) presents the results of the analysis. We can draw four conclusion from the findings: First, 
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is reasonably small, ranging from 0.869 to 0.907. 
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Second, most of the political and institutional variables do not have very much explanatory power in 
the sense that they are all statistically significant, although t-values for some are reasonably high. 
Only the number of ministers in a government and the number of years of the chief executive party 
in office seems to have a significant impact in all the models. Partisan variables perform better: The 
negative sign on the coefficient of the interaction variable between socialdemocratic share of seats in 
government and unemployment rates indicates that socialdemocratic governments seem to be willing 
to run higher deficits in times of high unemployment (confirming Carlsen 1997). In other times, left 
governments seem to run higher surplusses / lower deficits than christian democratic or conservative 
governments. This can be seen as an indication of the hypothesis that right wing governments tend to 
increase deficits, because they focus on lowering taxes without implementing the necessary spending 
cuts (Cameron 1985; Cusack 1999). The magnitude of the effect is not negligible: A complete 
turnover from a purely christian democratic government to a purely socialdemocratic one is 
associated with an improvement in current deficits of 1.7%, controlling for all the other independent 
variables. 
Third, let us look at macro-institutional variables: Central bank independence seems not to be 
associated with changes in current deficits, although it may be important for gross debt levels. The 
results show that a high number of vetoplayers in a country are associated with higher deficits. 
Vetoplayers often play the role of countermajoritarian institutions, thereby making it hard for 
governments to implement spending cuts or non-expansive welfare state reforms, because vetopoints 
allow opposition forces to enter the political struggle and to blame the governments for unpopular 
measures. The government is thus very reluctant to implement these reforms. 
Fourth, let us look at the international variables. The sign of the trade openness variable gives limited 
support to the ‘compensation thesis’, i.e. higher exposure to international competition leads to more 
fiscal prudence. EMU-membership or membership in the EU during the 1990s (being part of the 
wider process of fiscal consolidation that followed the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty) does not 
seem to have too much of an impact on current fiscal deficits. Furthermore, there is no difference 
between countries in the Eurozone and the ones that stay outside. But the sign of the coefficient 
indicates that EMU membership has had a positive impact on the fiscal performance of member 
states. What is more, this effect is discernible even when we control for central bank indepence 
(CBI). Membership in EMU is therefore not only about making your country’s central bank more 
independent, there is also a positive effect on fiscal policy independent of CBI. 
Table 2  
Table 2(8) presents the results of a re-analysis with the same independent, but a different dependent 
variable, namely changes in gross debt levels as percentage points changes between gross debt levels 
in % of GDP.(9) Because the lagged dependent variable is not included as independent variable,(10) 
the R² is siginificantly lower (it varies between 0.3 and 0.4). On the other hand, it has more 
explanatory power in the sense that a higher R² now provides more substantive information about the 
goodness-of-fit of the model. 
In general, the findings are confirmed. The sign of the coefficient on the ‘number of ministers in 
cabinet’ indicates that a higher number of ministers in a cabinet results in higher levels of gross debt. 
The larger the majority of the party in government in parliament, the more probable it is that the 
government will reduce or avoid high increases in gross debt levels. A government with a large 
majority in the legislature is less willing to increase gross debt levels, because the visibility of its 
actions is very high and it can be easily blamed for incautious fiscal policies. 
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Also, the years that the party of the head of government stays in power (government turnover rate) 
has a positive impact on fiscal performance. Parties that stay in power longer seem to adopt a more 
long-term view on fiscal policy issues, which is rational, because the probability that they will still 
be in power then is quite high. These findings are in line with the mainstream in political economy 
literature (going back to Roubini / Sachs 1989b). 
Partisan variables perform well, too, and give some support on the above mentioned thesis on the 
unability of right wing parties in governments to reduce debt levels. This is especially true for 
christian democratic parties, who are more reluctant towards spending cuts in the welfare state than 
conservative parties (Van Kersbergen 1995). The signs and hypotheses about CBI and vetoplayers 
are also confirmed. It is striking that the CBI variable performs much better than in the preceding 
analysis in terms of statistical significance. A possible explanation for this might be that for 
governments, the central bank’s grip on interest rates has a deterring effect only for gross debt levels, 
whereas the deterrence effect for running current account deficits is not as strong. 
Most important for our analysis is however the strong performance of the EMU variables. EU-
membership during the 1990s and participation in the process of fiscal consolidation triggered by the 
Maastricht treaty has had a positive impact of fiscal performace. This is not only true for the later 
members of the Eurozone, but also for the countries that did not join the third stage of EMU (as can 
be seen from the higher magnitude of the “EU member after 1992” dummy). Trade openness also 
had a positive and statistically significant impact on fiscal performance. 
The overall conclusion of this analysis is that (prospective) membership in the EMU has had a 
significant and positive impact on the fiscal performance of member states. It is remarkable, that this 
EMU effect can be traced even when controlling for a variety of other variables, that have been 
regarded as most influential for fiscal performance of nation states. 
The question that arises at the end of this chapter is if this effect can be ascribed to the supranational 
institutional arrangements of EMU (i.e. the Stability and Growth Pact) or if membership in the EMU 
was just another argument in the domestic political battle between governments, social actors, and 
voters. A positive answer to the first hypothesis would support liberal and functional interpretations 
of the process of European integration, while a positive answer to the latter would imply a stronger 
role of the nation state. A crucial test for both perspectives is to look at the fiscal performance after 
1999, when the impact of supranational arrangements is expected to be even stronger.  
3. The fiscal performance of EU member states and non-
member states  
This chapter tries to trace the Maastricht effect beyond 1999, contrasting the development in EU and 
EMU member countries with non-members.(11) The impact of EMU could be rated positive if we 
can trace a process of continuous improvement in deficits and debt levels in EU and / or EMU 
countries compared to non-EU members over the past two decades.  
Table 3 
Table 3 displays some key figures. Generally, EU member states have performed worse, no matter if 
fiscal performance is measured by looking at the current fiscal balance, the change in debt levels, or 
the gross debt level itself. Deficits are higher, debt levels have increased faster, and the level of gross 
debt is generally higher in EU member states than in non-EU countries. Above all, the difference in 
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Looking at the dynamics though gives a more detailed picture. While in the period between 1980 and 
1991, when the process towards EMU was more a distant future vision than a real policy project, the 
differences between EU and non-EU countries was most pronounced. EU countries had an average 
debt level of 63.47% of GDP compared to 45.84% for non-EU countries, a striking difference of 
17.62 percentage points! EU member states also ran significantly higher deficits (5.64% of GDP 
versus 1.85%). One reason for the generally lower debt levels in non-EU countries is the different 
nature of welfare state regimes. These countries are among others Japan, USA, New Zealand, 
Australia, and Canada, all belonging to the liberal family of welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen 
1990; Obinger / Wagschal 2000). This group of countries is denoted by common features like a lean 
welfare state, low public spending on social policy, and a tendency towards the use of regulation 
instead of spending to steer the economy. 
During the period between 1992 and 1997, the process of economic integration was set into motion 
and the prospect of the decision on the number of countries to join EMU in 1997 fuelled serious 
efforts to improve fiscal performance. The data shows that this period is a turning point. Above, I 
already mentioned that under special circumstances, high deficits can go along with slower increases 
in debt levels. And exactly this seems to be the case. While current fiscal balances in EU member 
states remain higher than in non-EU countries, the debt levels have not increased as fast as in the 
other countries. In the EU, the average increase of debt levels in this period was 1.27% of GDP per 
year, compared to 2.65% for non-EU countries. The difference in debt levels between the two groups 
has fallen from 17.62% to 12.54%, although debt levels in the EU countries are still significantly 
higher. 
The trend seems to continue in the period between 1998 and 2002. Arguments that question the 
effectiveness of the EMU in constraining member states in spending in the long run expect the 
resurgence of high deficits after the threat of being excluded from the highly prestigious project of 
EMU is over. Because the decision on the number of member countries is made and has been made 
in a very compromising way, interpreting the convergence criteria taking political considerations 
into account, the external constraint of compliance is weakened. 
Liberal or institutionalist theories would argue, that just after 1999, when the position of ECB was 
strengthened and the final stage of the economic and monetary union had been entered, fiscal 
performance should have increased further or at least not deteriorated. Functionalist theories have 
expected the spill-over from the single market to monetary and economic integration and predict a 
further step towards a common economic policy that encompasses monetary and fiscal policy. The 
final stage of EMU has institutionalized a Central Bank that is even more independent than its 
German model, because its legal framework is laid down in an international treaty that is harder to 
modify than the simple law upon which the German Bundesbank was based. The Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) is the second important component of the EMU. There has however not been a 
step towards a higher degree of institutionalization of the SGP after entering the third stage. 
The data in table 3 indicate that the trend of the 1990s has not been reversed after 1998, but 
reinforced. The difference in debt levels has decreased further 6.64% of GDP, making the difference 
in means statistically insignificant. The same logic applies to current fiscal balances. The trend in the 
changes in debt levels variable is also more pronounced and, for the first time since the 1980s, has 
led to a real reduction in debt levels, not only to a lower increase. EU members have decreased their 
debts on average by 2.26% of GDP per year, compared to only 0.54% for non-EU countries.
Seite 9 von 18 EIoP: Text 2004-008: Full Text
06.07.2004 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-008.htm10
A caveat has to be added to this analysis: The data also shows a general trend towards an enhanced 
fiscal performance in the 1990s. The EU member states have followed this trend, but at the same 
time, they have outperformed non-EU countries in relative terms, although they only managed to 
reduce the difference and not to outperform non-EU countries in absolute terms. The picture gets 
sharper when we look at EMU countries instead of EU member states.  
Table 4 
In the period between 1992 and 1997, the difference in debt levels shrinks to 6.85%. Differences in 
current balances are not significant any more (-3.84% of GDP for non-EMU countries, -3.54% for 
EMU members). With regard to changes in gross debt level, EMU countries clearly outperform non-
EMU states, indicating that the efforts of EMU countries to join were mainly aimed at reducing the 
debt levels, less at reducing the deficit. 
The period between 1998 and 2002 includes some surprises, because we can discern first signs of a 
deteriorating fiscal performance. Although EMU countries managed to balance their budgets, non-
EMU member countries performed better by achieving surplusses of 1.14 of GDP on average. The 
difference between the two groups has increased again and is almost statistically significant. EMU 
countries continue to outperform non-EU states in efforts to reduce debt levels, although the 
difference is decreasing here, too. The difference in levels of gross debt could be reduced further 
from 6.85% of GDP for the period between 1992 and 1997 to 5.91% between 1998 and 2002. But 
EMU members still have a higher level of public debt than non-EMU countries (67.49% compared 
to 61.58%). 
To sum up, the inspection of differences in means has produced some insights. First, there has been 
an overall trend towards improved fiscal perfomance in all 22 OECD states. Second, EU member 
states have decreased the performance gap towards non-EU countries, achieving almost similar 
performance levels at the end of the 1990s. Third, EU countries were more successful in reducing 
debt levels than they were in reducing deficits. Fourth, trends for EMU members were similar in 
direction, but more pronounced in size. Therefore, membership in the EMU (or prospective 
membership for the period between 1992 and 1997) has enhanced fiscal performance. This confirms 
the results of our analysis in chapter 2. Finally, there are some signs for the latest period that point 
towards a deterioration in fiscal performance for EMU members. At this point of the analysis, one 
cannot say if these signs are systematically linked to weaknesses in the institutional arrangement of 
the EMU or if they are temporal fluctuations. The next chapter will deal with this question. 
4. Small versus big states: Equal constraints for all?  
This chapter tries to trace differences in performance between big and small member states of the 
EU.  
Table 5 
‘Big’ countries in this analysis are France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, small 
countries are all the others. This is a very crude distinction with regard to actual population levels, 
but it is a distinction that has proven to be politically very significant in the EU context. 
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Table 5 shows that small countries have in general performed better than big countries. But 
interestingly, on average, small countries have a higher debt level (76.71% compared to 74.09% for 
the big countries). But this changes for the latest period in which small countries only had a debt 
level of 62.62% compared to 76.15% for big countries. Small countries have managed to generate 
budget surplusses of on average 0.91%, while big countries are still struggling with deficits of about 
1.51%. Small countries also have a higher negative rate of debt level change (-2.64% versus -
1.51%), indicating that small countries managed to reduce debt levels faster than big countries. In 
general, small EU member states perform better with regard to debt levels, changes in debt levels, 
and deficits than big countries do. What is more, the relationship between size of a country and fiscal 
performance seems to hold only for the EU context of the 1990s. Plugging the variable ‘population 
size’ in the analytical framework of chapter 2 (in bivariate or multiple regressions) does not yield 
statistically significant results. 
The findings from the data are supported by the analysis of Von Hagen / Hallett / Strauch (2001), 
who distinguish between successful and unsuccessful consolidation strategies. They challenge the 
simple assumption that large consolidations are the most successful ones. Instead, they point to the 
importance of the nature of the consolidation. Successful consolidations are in their view those that 
are driven by expenditure cuts without reducing public capital investments, unsuccessful 
consolidations those that focus on creating more revenue without implementing the necessary 
spending cuts that imply high political costs (ibd.: 8-9). Their data show that the effect of 
consolidation strategies that are based on expenditure cuts is more sustainable in the long term than 
the effects of revenue-based strategies. They find successful consolidation predominantly in Austria, 
Finland, Sweden, and the UK, unsuccessful consolidation are to be found in Greece, Portugal, and 
Germany (ibd.: 39). However, the fiscal performance of the UK has been deteriorating since and in 
2003, it breached the 3% ceiling. Greece and Portugal are small countries and are prone to 
clientelism, which makes fiscal consolidation hard. What is more, Portugal had shown some real 
effort to consolidate after having violated the 3% criterion in 2001. 
There are two explanations for the better performance of small countries. First, in the period before 
the final stage of EMU was entered in 1999, the threat of being excluded from EMU because of the 
failure to meet the convergence criteria was more real for small countries than for the large countries 
in the core of the EU. Smaller countries, especially in the European periphery (Portugal, Greece, 
Ireland, Finland), had to cope with the serious threat of not being included into the EMU. This was 
also true for states in the European core like Belgium or the Netherlands, both of which had to 
undergo serious reforms to convince the bigger countries (mainly Germany) of their ability to join. 
Spain and Italy were borderline cases (Boix 2000). Speculation if these countries could have joined 
even if they had not been able to fulfill the convergence criteria at least to some extent is 
superfluous. But in the Italian case, domestic political actors had a strong incentive to use EMU as a 
“vincolo esterno” (Dyson / Featherstone 1996) to overcome domestic barriers against reform. In 
Germany and France, the credibility of the threat of being excluded from EMU was very limited.(12)
It was rather obvious, that if Germany and France were not able to meet them, the criteria would be 
interpreted more flexibly or the whole project of monetary union would be postponed. Thus, the 
threat of being excluded could not be used by the French and German governments as effectively to 
overcome domestic barriers to reform as in other countries. 
The second explanation for the better performance of small states lies in the institutional 
arrangement of the SGP. Because the SGP regime on fiscal policy still contains important elements 
of intergouvernmentalism, power relations between small and big states are mirrored in the extent to 
which compliance with supranational rules can be enforced. 
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Small states are constrained more, because coalition-building in the Council to avoid sanctioning is 
harder for them than for big states with more power resources. First, I briefly go through the legal 
provisions of the EC treaty to show that in the field of fiscal policy, the role of the nation states is 
more pronounced than in other fields, f.e. monetary policy. Second, a look at the first cases of 
violations of the SGP (Portugal, France, Germany) clarifies that the ability of the Commission to 
sanction and therefore the extent to which member states comply with the rules of the SGP depends 
on the size and power of the condemned country. 
Art. 104 of the EC treaty regulates the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) that is binding for every 
EU member. Council Regulation 1467/97 covers the specifics of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP). In contrast to the field of monetary policy, fiscal policy within the SGP still has a strong 
intergovernmental component. Monetary policy is in the hands of the highly independent European 
Central Bank, whereas in the EDP after the Comission has already reached a decision that deficits in 
a country are ‘excessive’ the Council can decide if it wants to follow the Commission by qualitative 
majority. This intergovernmental element in decision-making weakens the power of the SGP, 
because it challenges the effectiveness of the sanctions mechanism. A monetary union like the EMU 
is always faced with massive free-riding problems: Some countries enjoy the benefits of 
memberships (high currency stability) without paying the price (sound fiscal policy). Because 
Germany feared that countries like Italy would become the free-riders of the new monetary union, 
the former finance minister Theo Waigel strongly promoted the establishment of the SGP. The 
problem of free-riding was believed to be minimized by establishing an institutional arrangement 
like the SGP that gives clear guidelines on fiscal policy and contains a strong sanctions mechanism. 
The Council can force the compliance of member states by requiring deposits that can eventually be 
transformed into fines with an upper limit of 0.5% of the violating state’s GDP if the member state in 
question does not follow the recommendations of the Council and does not reduce its deficit 
accordingly. 
The weak point in the EDP is the possible discretionary leeway that is given to the Council. After the 
first report of the Commission the Council can decide if the deficit is ‘excessive’ “having considered 
any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make” (Art. 104 (6) EC Treaty). 
The Council makes recommendations to the member state how to solve the problems. Only when the 
deficit remains excessive over a period of time may the Council “decide to give notice to the 
Member State to take, within a specified time-limit, measures for the deficit reduction which is 
judged necessary by the Council in order to remedy the situation“ (Art. 104 (9) EC Treaty). After the 
Council has made a decision according to Paragraph 9, the Council may then decide to require 
deposits or fines (Art. 104 (11) EC Treaty). The EDP is thus a long process that is vulnerable to all 
sorts of political pressure on the various stages. The Council for example decided on January 21st 
and on June 3rd 2003 that the deficits of Germany and France, respectively, are to be called 
‘excessive’, but just a few months later the Council refused to follow the recommendations of the 
Commission to press ahead with sanctions. 
A telling example for the different impact the SGP and EMU had on fiscal performance is the 
comparison between the cases of Portugal, Germany, and France. Portugal was the first country to 
breach the 3% ceiling in 2001. The Council found in November 2002 that an excessive deficit exists 
in Portugal. The newly elected center-right government under José Manuel Durao Barroso promised 
to cut the deficit from 4.1% in 2001 to 2.8% in 2002, although it had come to power only in April 
2002. Portugal’s finance minister, Ms Manuela Ferreira Leite, said: “The end of the world for us 
would be finding that we weren´t taking the necessary measures and that we could face 
sanctions.” (The Irish Times, Nov 6 2002, p. 16)
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Barroso reacted to the Council’s condemnation by imposing spending cuts, increases in the value-
added tax, delayed tax reductions, and a freeze in civil recruitment (Financial Times, Dec 12 2002, p. 
4), which triggered a country-wide 24-hour general strike in December 2002. The Portuguese 
government reached its aim for 2002 and reduced the deficit to 2.7% of GDP. Although the 
prospects for future budget balances do not look as rosy anymore, the case of Portugal can still be 
regarded as an example of a country in which the rules and institutions of the SGP have led to an 
enhancement in fiscal performance, even though it meant large political costs for the incumbent 
Barroso. The disciplining impact of the SGP was strong, because Portugal could expect to be 
sanctioned by the Council for not complying with the SGP. Because it is a small country with only 
few allies other than Spain and maybe Luxembourg, it could not count on being left unpenalized. 
The case is different for France and Germany. Both countries have breached the 3% ceiling for 2002, 
2003, 2004 (Financial Times London, May 5, 2004, p. 6), and are expected to do so for 2005 (FT 
London, May 10 2004, p. 6) . Britain has joined its partners in violating the EU’s budgetary rules for 
the year 2003 (The Daily Telegraph, Feb 28 2004, p.30). In November 2003, the Council did not 
follow the Commission’s proposals to impose sanctions on Germany and France(13). Britain has 
supported both in their efforts to form a qualitative majority to avoid condemnation. The 
Netherlands, Austria, and Finland as well as Sweden protested violently against the Council’s 
decision to let Germany and France get away. Gerrit Zalm, the Dutch finance minister, even said that 
some countries had been “intimidated” by France and Germany (Sunday Times, Nov 30 2003, p. 
10). The constellation big versus small states is clearly identifiable. Governments of small states 
were furious, because they had invested much political capital in complying with the Stability Pact. 
Now they had to witness the deconstruction of the Pact, because big states did not manage to keep 
their finances under control. This becomes even more painful, when one keeps in mind that the SGP 
had been introduced following an initiative by the very same states that now did not manage to 
comply. Many of the small states had to buy their membership of the EMU at a high price, because 
the fiscal conservatism of the SGP was against their political preferences. This is not only true for 
social democratic countries like Sweden, Finland, Austria, or Denmark, but also for Belgium that 
used public spending to cope with its internal divisions, or Greece and Portugal which had to come 
clear of clientelism. 
The failure of imposing sanctions on the two most important countries in the EU shows the 
weaknesses of the institutional arrangement of the SGP. Letting the Council decide on sanctions 
introduces a strong element of intergovernmental decision-making. Instead of multilateralism, which 
implies a certain degree of equality between states, intergovernmentalism tends to reinforce existing 
inequalities in power. To allow the Council a discretionary decision on the final imposition of 
sanctions can be regarded as a ‘safety mechanism’ deliberately installed by the political actors when 
they were negotiating about EMU during the Maastricht conference. However, this safety 
mechanism could tear down the whole project of the SGP.  
5. Conclusions and outlook  
This paper has shown that the process towards EMU and the SGP has had a positive impact on fiscal 
performance in the last decade, although there are signs of deteriorating performance at the 
beginning of the new decade. The second finding of this paper is that small states have generally 
perfomed better. The reason for this is presumably the weak position of the small states in the intra-
EU power struggle. Small states had to cope with the serious possibility of being excluded from 
EMU. They could also not rely on a strong coalition of allies in the Council to bail them out. The 
implication of these findings is that in the field of fiscal policy the role of the nation states remains 
more important than the seemingly ambitious EMU integration project would make one expect.
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The deteriorating fiscal performance of big states in the last years indicates that the institutional 
arrangement of the SGP alone cannot prevent unsound fiscal policies. Thus, in the field of fiscal 
policy, intergovernmental theories seem to have more explanatory power than functionalist 
approaches, which expect a continuing high fiscal performance. 
The idea of the project of the SGP was to impose an external constraint on governments to stymie 
them in unresponsible spending. This constraint was supposed to function similarly as the 
independent central bank for monetary policy did. The problem of the SGP is that it had never been 
an external constraint, because it was not independent of the governments’ decisions in the Council. 
The fundamental flaw in the construction of the SGP is not necessarily its rigidity, which has led the 
head of the Commission, Romano Prodi, to call the Stability Pact “stupid” in October 2002. The 
fundamental flaw lies more in the fact that the SGP was never an external constraint, but merely a 
temporary self-constraint. In that it is similar to a self-prescribed healthy diet, including the vicious 
‘yoyo’ effect in the aftermath. 
The position of the Commission to sue the Council for not upholding treaty law is understandable, 
but dangerous. The non-compliance of Germany and France seriously questions the supranational 
basis of the European integration project. Out of this perspective, the Commission has to adopt an 
uncompromising stance if it wants to uphold its position and the supranational nature of the 
European project. The Commission fully understood the scope of this challenge, as this statement of 
a spokesman shows: “It had to be done. It’s our role to see that treaty provisions are upheld. This 
kind of approach could be repeated if we don’t clarify the situation.” (The Daily Telegraph, Jan 14 
2004, p. 29) 
The upcoming enlargement increases the vulnerability of the supranational project. The failure of 
making old EU member states comply with treaty regulations could coincide with a tendency to re-
interpret the European project that results from a possible overstretch of European institutions in an 
enlarged union with an ever wider variety of nations, cultures, and languages. A weakening of the 
position of the Commission could complicate efforts to uphold the supranational nature of the EU. 
In the end, the show-down in front of the Court that the Commission will provoke by enhancing 
legal action against the Council could be counterproductive. Instead, it would have been better if the 
Commission had come forward with substantial and well-coordinated proposals on how to reform 
the SGP and the EDP, when criticism was growing in 2002 and 2003. The Commission losing the 
battle is a real danger, although the European Court of Justice has often ruled in favor of 
integrationist positions, even when this implied a serious bending of treaty provisions. The Court is 
not only a judiciary, but also a political institution that is interested in the continuation of the 
European integration process.  
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Endnotes  
(1) Being one of the few exceptions, Freitag (2000) expects the Euro to be strong in the long term, 
because of the general political framework and the credibility of the fiscal policy regime of the EU 
(the SGP). Heinmann (2000) with his optimistic view is also an exception. 
(2) Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
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06.07.2004 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-008.htmIreland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, United States. 
(3) The constructed variable (SOZUNEM) is obtained by multiplication of the variable ‘percentage 
share of social democratic parties’ members in government’ (PROZ_SD) and unemployment rates 
(UNEMPL). 
(4) See also De Haan / Sturm 1994, who find no effect of Roubini and Sachs variables on fiscal 
deficits even if they are disintegrated into categorical variables for each dimension.  
(5) In fact, Sakamoto (2001: 535) finds that the weakness of government variables are only weakly 
connected to institutional features of the electoral or party system. 
(6) This is an additive index as well. Its scale is from 0 to 10. Included dimensions: concordance 
democracy, federalism, central bank independence, Lijphart-Index of judiciary control of the 
legislative, EU-Membership, pronounced minority protection, bicameralism, coalition government, 
self-administrative structures in the public social insurances, direct democracy. I corrected Schmidt’s 
values for the countries that have not been members of the EU in the 1980s. The fact that EU 
membership is part of Schmidt’s index is somewhat problematic, because I also control for EU and 
EMU membership in dummy variables. But my dummy variables aim to capture the effect of the 
1990s (and are 0 for the 1980s) and EU membership is only one out of ten criteria in Schmidt’s 
index. 
(7) To test robustness I also ran the same regressions in fixed-effects models. The signs and the 
magnitude of the coefficients were similar, only the t-statistics are somewhat lower. 
(8) Again, to test robustness, the regressions were also run in a fixed-effects model.  
(9) Please be aware that the interpretation of the signs of the coefficients has turned around. While in 
the former analysis, a negative sign meant deteriorating fiscal perfomance, a negative sign in this 
analysis stands for a reduction in debt levels and is therefore performance-enhancing. For positive 
signs, vice versa. 
(10) Lagged gross debt is a lagged level variable and not a lagged dependent variable. 
(11) Membership in the EU is captured on a yearly basis: Greece joins 1981, Spain and Portugal in 
1986, Finland, Austria, and Sweden in 1995. The Non-EU member states referred to are the 
remaining states of the OECD country sample defined above. 
(12) Clift (2002) tells the French story of alternating periods of expansion and fiscal consolidation. It 
became clear in the last years, that the fiscal consolidation strategy that was followed by the French 
government in the late 1990s was not sustainable in the long term (cf. Von Hagen et al. 2001). 
(13) This action by the Council has triggerd legal action by the Commission, on which I comment 
briefly in the concluding remarks section. 
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06.07.2004 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-008.htmTable I: Pooled time-series analysis, dependent variable: current balance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var. Current Budget Balance (including interest payments) as % of GDP 
Lagged current balance
0.907 0.898 0.874 0.873 0.870
(41.25)** (39.02)** (34.96)** (35.66)** (35.27)**
GDP growth 
0.354 0.337 0.373 0.388 0.383
(9.47)** (8.80)** (8.41)** (8.85)** (8.70)**
Inflation 
-0.032 -0.038 -0.076 -0.062 -0.072
(2.73)** (2.95)** (3.32)** (2.66)** (3.16)**
Lagged unemployment 
-0.000 0.049 -0.028 -0.051 -0.049
(0.01) (1.36) (0.91) (1.65) (1.55)
# of ministers 
  -0.030 -0.032 -0.028 -0.027
  (1.78) (1.74) (1.48) (1.41)
Majority of gov. 
  -0.365 -0.322    
  (0.42) (0.33)    
Party in off (#y)
  -0.006 -0.019 -0.024 -0.024
  (0.44) (1.34) (1.86) (1.84)
Chief ex in off (#y)
  -0.027 -0.007    
  (0.94) (0.23)    
% of social dem in gov.
  0.009      
  (1.85)      
% of christ dem in gov.
  -0.008      
  (1.74)      
% of cons in gov.
  -0.005      
  (1.70)      
Interaction: SocDem Unem
  -0.001      
  (2.14)*      
Central Bank Independence
    0.003 0.053 -0.001
    (0.01) (0.09) (0.00)
Schmidt Veto Index
    -0.073 -0.078 -0.096
    (1.48) (1.64) (1.96)*
Trade Openness
      0.001 0.001
      (0.30) (0.41)
EU member after 1992
      0.533  
      (2.43)*  
Later Member of Eurozone
        0.431
        (1.73)
Constant
-0.868 -0.040 0.670 0.299 0.452
(3.93)** (0.06) (0.96) (0.46) (0.69)
Observations 418 416 362 362 362
Number of Countries 22 22 20 20 20
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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06.07.2004 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-008t.htmTable II: Pooled time-series analysis, dependent variable: changes in gross debt level 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.  Change in Gross Debt Levels (percentage points (% of GDP)
Lagged gross debt -0.059 -0.051 -0.031 -0.008 -0.009
(5.08)** (4.57)** (2.58)** (0.77) (0.85)
GDP growth -1.202 -1.148 -1.287 -1.317 -1.302
(12.85)** (12.19)** (11.38)** (11.76)** (11.55)**
Inflation 0.009 0.019 -0.004 -0.043 -0.008
(0.27) (0.58) (0.06) (0.68) (0.12)
Lagged unemployment 0.493 0.337 0.382 0.387 0.380
(5.64)** (3.16)** (4.15)** (4.54)** (4.36)**
# of ministers    0.093 0.109 0.027 0.019
  (1.60) (1.72) (0.47) (0.33)
Majority of gov.   -5.216 -5.653    
  (2.15)* (2.12)*    
Party in off (#y)   -0.013 -0.008 0.008 0.007
  (0.36) (0.21) (0.25) (0.19)
Chief ex in off (#y)   -0.029 -0.043    
  (0.40) (0.53)    
% of social dem in gov   -0.028 .    
  (2.11)*      
% of christ dem in gov.    0.034      
  (2.51)*      
% of cons in gov   0.003      
  (0.30)      
Interaction: SocDem Unem   0.002      
  (1.29)      
Central Bank Independence     -4.011 -3.797 -3.523
    (2.03)* (2.26)* (2.06)*
Schmidt Veto Index     0.343 0.253 0.324
    (1.96) (1.79) (2.24)*
Trade Openness       -0.020 -0.021
      (1.93) (2.05)*
EU member after 1992       -2.070 .
      (3.65)**  
Later Member of Eurozone         -1.8260.431
        (2.84)**
Constant 4.346 6.129 5.328 4.457 3.994
(4.81)** (3.18)** (2.25)* (2.31)* (2.03)*
Observations 399 397 343 343 343
Number of Countries 22 22 20 20 20
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Difference in means between EU member states and non-EU 
countries 
Table IV 
Difference in means between EMU member states and non-
EMU states 
1980-1991 1992-1997  1998-2002 
Current Fiscal  
Balance
Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU
-1.85 -5.64 -2.94 -4.16 1.07 0.20
 3.79 (p>0.000)  -3.69 (p>0.069)  0.87 (p>0.348)
Change in Gross  
Debt Level
Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU
1.77 2.29 2.65 1.27 -0.54 -2.26
 -0.52 (p>0.315)  1.38 (p>0.169)  1.72 (p>0.067)
Gross Debt Level
Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU
45.84 63.47 63.19 75.74 60.49 67.13
 -17.62 (p>0.000)  -12.54 (p>0.009)  -6.64 (p>0.3426)
 
 
1992-1997 1998-2002
Current Fiscal Balance
Non-EMU EMU Non-EMU EMU
-3.84 -3.54 1.14 0.00
-0.30 (p>0.640) 1.14 (p>0.134)
Change in Gross Debt Level
Non-EMU EMU Non-EMU EMU
2.67 0.92 -1.18 -2.10
1.75 (p>0.064) 0.91 (p>0.257)
Gross Debt Level
Non-EMU EMU Non-EMU EMU
67.50 74.37 61.58 67.49
-6.85 (p>0.185) -5.91 (p>0.336)
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Difference in Means in EU between small and big EU countries 
in the 1990s 
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1992-1997 1998-2002
Current Fiscal  
Balance
Small Big Small Big
-3.49 -5.29 0.91 -1.20
1.80 (p>0.009) 2.11 (p>0.000)
Change in Gross  
Debt Level
Small Big Small Big
-0.24 3.82 -2.64 -1.51
v-4.05 (p>0.000) -1.13 (p>0.102)
Gross Debt Level
Small Big Small Big
76.71 74.09 62.62 76.15
2.62 (p>0.725) -13.53 (p>0.049)
 
 
Seite 4 von 4 EIoP: Text 2004-008: Tables
06.07.2004 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-008t.htm